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ROMNEY v. LIN: ERISA PREEMPTION OF
SECTION 630 OF NEW YORK'S BUSINESS
CORPORATION LAW
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")' to establish a national uniform system of regulating employee benefit plans.2 Widespread abuse by
employers of employee benefit plans prompted the need for such
regulation.3 By subjecting employers to various and sometimes
' Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)) [hereinafter ERISA].
2 An employee benefit plan is defined to include both pension and welfare plans.
ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). An "employee pension benefit plan" is defined as
a plan that provides retirement income or income deferral. ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(2). An employee welfare benefit plan includes any program that provides
benefits for reasons such as illness, accident, disability, unemployment, or death.
ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). ERISA does not govern the substantive content of
employee benefit plans, nor does it require that they provide such plans. Walter E.
Schuler, Note, The ERISA Pre-Emption Narrows: Analysis of New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company and its
Impact on State Regulation of Health Care, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783, 787 (1996). Although the terms "plan," "fund," and "program" are not defined by ERISA, the
courts have given some guidance. For example, in Donovan v. Dillingham, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit defined an ERISA plan as,
"[w]hether from the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person can ascertain
the intended benefits, a class of beneficiaries, the source of financing, and procedures for receiving benefits." 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982). ERISA "imposes
participation, funding, and vesting requirements on pension plans. It also sets various uniform standards, including rules concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility, for both pension and welfare plans." See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983). ERISA is a "comprehensive statute designed to promote
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans." Id. at
90 (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981)).
' See Rebecca S. Fellman-Caldwell, Note, New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.: The Supreme Court Clarifies
ERISA Preemption,45 CATH. U. L. REV 1309, 1320 (1996) (citing employer abuse to
include inadequately financing and fraudulently administering plans, using employee contributions to pension plans to fund union activities not related to retirement, limiting plan coverage to small number of employees and benefiting only high
ranking employees); Schuler, supra note 2, at 787 (stating that throughout 1960's
pension plan abuses increased dramatically and ERISA responded to growing size
and scope of employee benefit plans and their financial impact on interstate commerce, employees and their dependents, and federal tax revenues); David T.
Shapiro, Note, The Remission of ERISA Preemption: An Examination of Blue
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conflicting regulations, piecemeal regulation of employee benefit
plans at the state and federal level proved to be inadequate. 4 "In
enacting ERISA, Congress was primarily concerned with the
mismanagement of funds accumulated to finance employee
benefits and the failure to pay employees benefits from accumulated funds."5
In response to these concerns, Congress
"established extensive reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary duty
requirements to insure against the possibility that the employee's expectation of the benefit would be6 defeated through
poor management by the plan administrator."
In addition to its regulatory requirements, ERISA contains a
comprehensive civil enforcement provision, section 502(a), that
allows a plan participant or beneficiary to bring a civil action to
recover benefits due, to enforce existing rights, or to clarify
rights to future benefits.7 Moreover, to facilitate uniform administration of the law, Congress included a broad preemption
provision to "allow a single set of regulations to govern the administration of benefit plans."8 Section 514(a) of ERISA states
Cross/Blue Shield v. Travelers Insurance Co., 28 CONN. L. REV. 917, 918 (1996)
("Fund administrators were infamous for exploiting plan assets in the mid-1900s."
(citing 120 CONG. REC. 29214 (1974) (statement of Rep. Daniels))).
See Fellman-Caldwell, supra note 3, at 1321-22 (explaining that state regulation led to lack of uniformity throughout nation); Schuler, supra note 2, at 787
(stating that previously existing "regulations and remedial mechanisms proved ineffective in the protection of employees' pension plan rights and in the deterrence of
pension plan abuses").
5 Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989) (citing California Hosp.
Ass'n v. Henning, 770 F.2d 856, 859 (1985)).
6 Morash, 490 U.S. at 114 (citingAlessi, 451 U.S. at 510).
ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a) (1994)). 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) provides in relevant part:
A civil action may be brought ... (3) by a participant ... (A) to enjoin any act
or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan ....
Id. "Congress intended § 502(a) to be the exclusive remedy for rights guaranteed
under ERISA .... Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144 (1990).
8 Fellman-Caldwell, supra note 3, at 1320; see New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 646 (1995)
("[Blasic thrust of the preemption clause was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in
order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.");
see also David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in
Effective Federalism,48 U. PITT. L. REV. 427, 429 (1987) (discussing ERISA's broad
preemption of state law); Susan Stabile, Preemption of State Law by FederalLaw: A
Task for Congressor the Courts?,40 VILL. L. REV. 1, 29-30 n.96 (1995) (arguing that
Congress' quest for uniformity has actually led to more confusion and discord in
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that, unless specifically exempt, 9 ERISA "supersede[s] any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to an
employee benefit plan." " Today, ERISA preemption is one of the
most frequently litigated issues under the statute and has resulted in the preemption of various state statutes and common

laws. "
Recently, in Romney v. Lin,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the question of whether
ERISA preempts section 630 of the New York Business Corporation Law ("BCL"). 3 Section 630 of the BCL was originally enfield of employee benefits laws); Fellman-Caldwell, supra note 3, at 1321-22
("Without ERISA's preemption clause, employee benefit plans could be subjected to
fifty different sets of state law, resulting in unreasonable administrative costs that
might discourage employers from providing employee benefits."); see generally
Daniel W. Sherrick, ERISA Preemption: An Introduction, 64 MIcH. Bus. L.J. 1074
(1985) (discussing ERISA's preemption provision).
0 ERISA § 514(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (laws regulating insurance, banking,
and securities, as well as government plans, tax exempt church plans, and plans in
compliance with worker's compensation, unemployment compensation, and disability insurance are exempt from ERISA preemption); see also Catherine L. Fisk, Article: The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption?A Case Study of the
Failureof Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 46 (1996) ("ERISA covers any employer or employer-union 'plan, fund or program' that provides pensions or benefits
for health care, child care, vacations, sickness, disability, death, apprenticeship,
training or scholarships.") (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (2) (1988)). "[Pllans specifically exempt are those maintained 'solely' to comply with state workers' compensation, disability, or unemployment laws government and church sponsored plans." Id.
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1988)).
19 ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
" Fisk, supra note 9, at 35. ERISA has been held to preempt laws relating to
family leave, prevailing wage laws, working conditions of apprentices, mechanics'
liens, wrongful death, taxes on hospitals, medical malpractice claims, etc. Id. at 37.
"It is a rich irony that ERISA, which was heralded at its enactment as significant
federal protective legislation, has through its preemption provision been the basis
for invalidating scores of protective state laws." Id. at 38. ERISA itself does not indicate whether a particular state law relates to a plan in a manner that it should be
preempted. Id. at 49. If a state law is preempted, or superseded, by ERISA, the logical question then becomes "what would they be 'superseded' by. Presumably, the
laws would be superseded by silence, that is by the absence of regulation." Id. at 49.
12 Romney v. Lin, 94 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1996).
'3 BCL section 630 provides in relevant part:
(a) The ten largest shareholders ... of every corporation ... , no shares of
which are listed on a national securities exchange or regularly quoted in an
over-the-counter market by one or more members of a national or an affiliated securities association, shall jointly and severally be personally liable
for all debts, wages or salaries due and owing to any of its laborers, servants or employees ....
(b) For the purposes of this section, wages or salaries shall mean all compensation and benefits payable by an employer to or for the account of the
employee for personal services rendered by such employee. These shall
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acted to provide employees with protection in the event of employer insolvency.14 BCL section 630(a) imposes joint and several
liability on the ten largest shareholders of a closely-held corporation for specified corporate obligations enumerated in the statute.15 Specifically, the ten largest shareholders are personally liable for "all debts, wages or salaries due and owing to any of its
laborers, servants or employees." 6 BCL section 630(b) defines
"wages and salaries" to include "employer contributions to or
payments of insurance or welfare benefits [and] employer contributions to pension or annuity funds ."
Significantly, as it
applies to pension plans, the statute imposes liability on shareholders only after the corporate entity fails to satisfy a judgment
for delinquent contributions. 8
After obtaining a judgment

Id.

specifically include but not be limited to salaries, overtime, vacation, holiday and severance pay; employer contributions to or payments of insurance
or welfare benefits; employer contributions to pension or annuity funds;
and other moneys properly due or payable for services rendered by such
employee.

4 See Lindsey v. Winkler, 277 N.Y.S.2d 768, 770 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County
1967)
("Section 630 of the Business Corporation Law was enacted as a safeguard to laborers, servants or employees of corporations which, upon insolvency of the corporation, would leave such working people without recourse and payment for their work,
labor and services.").
'r N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 630(a) (McKinney 1986); see Jeffrey S. Klein &
Nicholas J. Pappas, The Preemption of Liability for Unpaid Wages, Benefits, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 2, 1996, at 3 (tracing section 630 as statutory cause of action against corporation's shareholders to Manufacturing Corporations Act of 1848). N.Y. SESS.
LAWS 1848, ch. 40, sec. 18 stated: "[tihe stockholders of any company organized under the provisions of this act, shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts that
may be due and owing their laborers, servants and apprentices, for services performed for such corporation." Id. at 4 n.1. The Court of Appeals narrowed section
630's predecessor, Stock Corporation Law section 71, by holding that the New York
law did not apply to foreign corporations doing business in New York. See Armstrong v. Dyer, 198 N.E. 551 (N.Y. 1935). The effect of section 630 has increased
concerns regarding the liability of corporate executives and the need for personal
liability insurance. Robert H. Roshe, New York's Response to the Director and Officer Liability Crisis: A Need to Reexamine the Importance of D&O Insurance, 54
BROOK. L. REv. 1305, 1351-53 (1989) (discussing need to enhance personal liability
protection for corporate directors and officers).
'6N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 630(a) (McKinney 1986).
'7 Id.
§ 630(b). Section 630(b) defines "wages" and "salaries" as "all compensation and benefits payable by an employer ...
for personal services rendered by such
employee." Id. Such services include "salaries, overtime, vacation, holiday and severance pay; employer contributions to or payments of insurance or welfare benefits;
employer contributions to pension or annuity funds; and any other moneys properly
due or payable for services rendered by such employee." Id.
18 Id.
§ 630(a) ("An action to enforce such liability shall be commenced within
ninety days after the return of an execution unsatisfied against the corporation
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against a corporation for failure to make contributions to an
employee pension plan, BCL section 630 allows a plan fiduciary
or participant to enforce the un-executed judgment against the
corporation's ten largest shareholders.19
In Romney,"° the Second Circuit held that ERISA preempts
BCL section 630. 21 In this case, the plaintiff-employee (the
"Union") obtained an arbitration award against a closely-held
New York corporation ("Goodee Fashions") for failure to make
required contributions to four union benefit funds.22 The Supreme Court of New York County confirmed the award and issued a judgment.' After an unsuccessful attempt to enforce the
judgment against the corporation, the Union sued the principal
shareholder ("Lin") of Goodee Fashions under BCL section 630 to
enforce the judgment.2 4 Lin removed the action to federal court,25
and the district court dismissed the claim for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. 2' The Union's motion to
remand was denied, and the Union appealed to the Second Cirupon a judgment recovered against it for such services.").
19 Id.

2194 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1996).

Id.

at 76; see also Employee Benefits: ERISA Preempts Law Holding Shareholders Liable for DelinquentPlan Contributions,BNA CORP. COUNS. DAILY, Oct. 7,
1996, at D4; David E. Rovella, ERISA Pre-empts Suit Against Stockholders, NAT'L L.
J., Sept. 16, 1996, at B3.
22 Romney, 94 F.3d at 74. Goodee Fashions, a New York corporation,
entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with the Union whereby the corporation was
obligated to make contributions to employee benefit funds. Id. at 77. Only three of
these funds were ERISA funds and were at issue on appeal. Id. Goodee Fashions
failed to make the contributions and the Union eventually won a default arbitration
award. Id. The award was confirmed by the New York State Supreme Court and a
judgment was entered in the amount of $70,647.17. Id. Execution against the corporation was returned unsatisfied. Id. at 74. Romney, the Union's Manager-Secretary,
instituted this action. Id.
2 Id. at 77.
24 Id.
25See Romney v. Lin, 894 F. Supp. 163, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 94 F.3d 74
21

(2d Cir. 1996). The claim was originally filed in Supreme Court, New York County.
Id. Defendant removed the suit on the basis that the claim was preempted by
ERISA. Id26Romney, 94 F.3d at 77 (dismissing claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)).
In ruling that section 630 was preempted by ERISA the district court reasoned that
"ERISA contains a detailed provision regarding civil enforcement" and that the
ERISA enforcement scheme "does not authorize any type of action against officers
and stockholders of a corporate employer to recover contributions owed to an ERISA
fund." Romney, 894 F. Supp. at 166; see Romney v. Cai, Nos. 94 CV 2546-94 CV
2548, 1996 WL 331184, *3 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)) (agreeing that ERISA preempts BCL §
630).
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cuit arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claim.27

The Second Circuit prefaced its ruling on the jurisdiction
and removal issues with a discussion of the doctrine of complete
preemption. 28 Under the doctrine of complete preemption, in order for the state law claim to be properly removed to federal
court, it must both "relate to" an ERISA plan within the meaning
of ERISA's preemption provision and be supplanted by ERISA's
civil enforcement provision." The Second Circuit then concluded
that BCL section 630 "relate[d] to" ERISA and fell "within the
scope of [ERISA's] civil enforcement provision."" The suit, held
the Romney court, was therefore properly removed to federal
court."1 After determining removal jurisdiction was properly conferred, the Second Circuit concluded that ERISA preempted section 630 of the BCL.3 2 The court reasoned that "§ 630 'relates to'
ERISA (1) because it refers to ERISA plans, or, alternatively, (2)
2' Romney, 94 F.3d at 74. Defendant Lin alleged removal jurisdiction on three

separate grounds: diversity of citizenship, preemption under the Labor Management
Relations Act, and preemption under ERISA. Id. at 77. The court concluded that
ERISA preemption conferred subject matter jurisdiction and did not address the
other possibilities. Id. at n.3. "[Pireemption alone is insufficient to support removal
jurisdiction ... the other requisite [is] whether Romney's suit under § 630 is 'within
the scope [of] the civil enforcement provisions' of ERISA § 502(a)." Id. at 78.
28 According to the well-pleaded complaint rule, a cause
of action does not arise
under federal law unless a federal question appears in the plaintiffs statement of
his claim. See Paul J. Ondrasik Jr. & Sara E. Hauptfuehrer, Removal Jurisdiction
in ERISA Cases - The Doctrine of 'Complete' Preemption, 4 No. 5 ERISA LITIG. REP.
4 (1995). "Under the so-called 'well-pleaded complaint rule' a case does not 'arise
under' federal law unless the federal question 'necessarily' appears in the plaintiffs
statement of his claim." Id. (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)).
Preemption, when asserted as a defense, does not transform a state law cause of
action into a claim arising under federal law. Id. "Complete preemption," however,
provides an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. at 4-5 (providing examples of how doctrine of complete preemption has been recognized with regard to
ERISA claims). A state law claim will be completely preempted by ERISA, and
therefore removable, only if the state law cause of action satisfies a two prong test:
(1) the state law claim must "relate to" an ERISA plan within the meaning of section
514(a); and (2) the state law claim must be supplanted by one under ERISA section
502(a), ERISA's civil enforcement provision. Id. at 5 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1982)). "When the doctrine of complete preemption does not apply, but the plaintiffs state claim is arguably preempted under
section 514(a), the district court, being without removal jurisdiction, cannot resolve
the dispute regarding preemption." Id. at 6.
'9 See supra note 28 for discussion of doctrine of complete preemption.
30 Romney, 94 F.3d at 83.
31 Id.
32 Id.

at 84.
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because it constitutes an 'alternative enforcement mechanism' to
ERISA § 502(a)."33 In the past, BCL section 630 had escaped
ERISA's preemptive effect and in rendering their decisions, both
the Second Circuit and the district court acknowledged a conflicting ruling by the New York Court of Appeals.
33

Id. at 83.

:" See Sasso v. Vachris, 484 N.E.2d 1359, 1363-64 (1985) (holding that section
630 was not preempted by ERISA). But see Romney v. Cai, Nos. 94 CV 2546-94CV
2548, 1996 WL 331184, *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that BCL section 630 was preempted by ERISA); McMahon v. McDowell, 479 U.S. 971, 971 (1986) (evidencing
Supreme Court's choice to remain silent on ERISA preemption of state regulations
similar to section 630); cf McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 108 (3d Cir. 1986)
(holding that Pennsylvania wage payment and collection law seeking to impose liability on employer or its officers and directors for unpaid pension plan contributions was preempted by ERISA). The Supreme Court denied certiorari to resolve the
matter despite Justice White's dissent acknowledging the conflict between Sasso
and McMahon. McMahon v. McDowell, 479 U.S. 971, 971 (1986).
In Sasso, the New York Court of Appeals held that ERISA did not preempt BCL
section 630. Sasso, 484 N.E.2d at 1363-64. The Sasso court reasoned that section
630 was remedial in nature, merely providing an additional enforcement mechanism
by which employees can recover delinquent contributions to employee benefit plans.
Id. at 1362. Relying on Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984), the Sasso
court stated that section 630 did not "regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and
conditions" of employee benefit plans and accordingly did not 'relate to" employee
benefit plans within the meaning of section 514(a) of ERISA_ Sasso, 484 N.E.2d at
1363-64 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2)). The Sasso court further stated that section
630 regulated only the employer and not the content of an employee benefit plan. Id.
at 1363 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758
(1985)); see also Patricia Loftus-Mattnews, Preemption or Preservation of State
Remedies UnderERISA? The New York Court of Appeals Preserves a State Remedy
in Sasso v. Vachris, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 567, 577 (1986) (discussing Sasso court's
reliance on MetropolitanLife Insurance Company and discussing Court of Appeals
analogy of laws regulating insurer to those regulating employer and concluding that
laws regulating only employer did not "relate to" ERISA plan).
The holding of Rebaldo was later overruled by Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990). Despite reliance on Rebaldo, Sasso was still regarded as
valid New York law. See Klein & Pappas, supra note 15, at 3 ("New York state
courts have continued to recognize that § 630 provides a viable cause of action
against shareholders for unpaid wages and salaries." ); see also 'Sasso' Is Still Valid
New York Law Despite FederalCases on Preemption, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 5, 1995, at 25
(stating that Justice Gerace upheld Sasso in Trustees of the National Automatic
Sprinkler Industry Pension Fund v. Sandberg based on United States Supreme
Court's refusal in McMahon v. McDowell, 479 U.S. 971 (1986), to disturb Sasso
opinion). The viability of a section 630 claim now depends on the forum where the
claim is ultimately adjudicated. See Klein & Pappas, supra note 15, at 4 ("[Inn light
of Romney's rejection of Sasso, the viability of a § 630 claim relating to an ERISA
plan in New York, at least for the time being, will depend on the forum where the
claim is ultimately adjudicated.") (italics added). Unless the New York Court of Appeals or the Second Circuit changes its position, the conflict will have to be resolved
by the Supreme Court or the New York Legislature. Id. Employers faced with this
type of claim will likely seek removal to federal court. Id.
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Part One of this Comment discusses the evolution of the law
surrounding ERISA's general policies and broad preemptive
power. Part Two analyzes the Romney decision and argues that
the Second Circuit erred in holding that BCL section 630 was
preempted by ERISA. Finally, Part Three discusses recent developments in the area of ERISA preemption.
I.

EVOLUTION OF

ERISA

PREEMPTION

The United States Supreme Court has addressed the scope
of ERISA preemption on many occasions 5 and has broadly construed ERISA's preemption provision. 6 Historically, the Supreme Court has applied a plain meaning approach when determining whether state laws were preempted by ERISA.3 ' This
plain meaning approach focused on interpreting the words

3' See, e.g., California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997); New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86 (1993); District of Columbia v. Greater
Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S.
113 (1990); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Massachusetts v. Morash,
490 U.S. 107 (1989); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825
(1988); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987);
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 724 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471
U.S. 724; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Alessi v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
'6 The preemption provision has been described as having "unparalleled
breadth." Holland v. Burlington Indus. Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1985).
ERISA contains an explicit and broad preemption provision. ERISA § 514(a), 29
U.S.C. 1144(a); see, e.g., Alessi, 451 U.S. at 524 (invalidating, on preemption
grounds, New Jersey statute that prohibited pension plans from offsetting workmen's compensation benefits against employee retirement benefits because it related to pension plans governed by ERISA by eliminating one method for calculating
pension benefits); see also Shapiro, supra note 3, at 294-95 (stating that words of
section 514 have been cause of "endless stream of litigation"). See generally Fisk,
supra note 9, at 47 (discussing case decisions interpreting "relates to" portion of
section 514, and noting that term "relates to" needs modifier in order to have concrete meaning and depending on modifier selected, term could take on many different possible meanings).
See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97 n.16 (turning to Black's Law Dictionary for definition of "relate" in order to interpret preemption provision and "relate" was defined
as: "To stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring
into association with or connection with"); GreaterWash. Bd. Of Trade, 506 U.S. 125
(relying on Black's Law Dictionary definition of "relate"); see also Fisk, supra note 9,
at 65 ("Shaw was the beginning of the Court's fruitless pursuit of a plain language
approach to ERISA preemption .... ").
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"relate to" in ERISA section 514(a)." Using this approach, state
laws were found to "relate to" benefit plans and were thus preempted, if "in the normal sense of the phrase, ... [the state law]

ha[d] a connection with or reference to such a plan."39 The fact
that a state law was not designed to affect, or had only an indirect effect on, an ERISA benefit plan would not save the state
law from preemption.40 Courts viewed the purpose of the state
law as irrelevant with regard to the issue of ERISA preemption.
ERISA was held to displace not only laws that were inconsistent
with the federal law, but those that were consistent with it as
well. 4 Some limitations, however, were placed on ERISA's preemption provision. For example, the Supreme Court held early
on that state laws that "affect employee benefit plans in too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner" do not warrant a
finding that the state law "relates to" the plan. 42 The Court,
however, provided little guidance as to what constitutes "too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral" and ultimately the limitation
provided little assistance when analyzing a state statute. 3
The sweeping nature of the plain meaning approach used by
the Supreme Court led to numerous challenges of virtually every
type of state regulation that was remotely related to employee
38 See,

e.g., GreaterWash. Bd. Of Trade, 506 U.S. 125; Ingersoll-Rand,498 U.S.

133; FMC Corp., 498 U.S. 52; Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. 1; Shaw, 463 U.S.
85. 8. Shaw,
463 U.S. 85 (finding that New York's Disability
Benefits Law had connection with or reference to ERISA plans); see also Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506
U.S 125 (1992) (finding law requiring "[a]ny employer who provides health insurance coverage for an employee ... [to] provide health insurance coverage equivalent
to the health insurance coverage of the employee while the employee receives or is
eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits under this chapter" was "related
to" ERISA plan).
40 Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. 41 (holding insurance bad faith tort claims
preempted).
"See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 (preempting New York Human Rights Law designed to further purpose of ERISA); see also Alessi, 451 U.S. at 524 ("Whatever the
purpose of the statute, we conclude that it 'relates to pension plans' governed by
ERISA because it eliminates one method for calculating pension benefits that is
permitted by federal law.") (emphasis added).
42 Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
Id. While the court provided no guidance as to what should be considered "too
remote or peripheral," it did, however, offer the example of American Telephone &
Telegraph Company v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979), which found that
state garnishment of man's income to enforce alimony and child support was not
preempted because it related to pension plans "in the most remote and peripheral
manner."
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benefit plans. In 1995, however, the Supreme Court dramatically departed from its plain meaning approach when it decided
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers Insurance Company." The
Blue Cross Court acknowledged that the text of ERISA's preemption provision was "unhelpful" in determining whether state
laws have a "connection with" ERISA plans.45 The Court stated
that "[i]
f 'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of
its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption
would never run its course, for '[r]eally, universally, relations
stop nowhere.' "" The Court then adopted a new approach to
ERISA preemption whereby "ERISA's objectives [would serve] as
a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive." "
II. ANALYSIS OF ROMNEY V. LIN
In holding that removal jurisdiction was properly conferred
upon the district court, the Second Circuit not only found that
"New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995). In Blue Cross, the Court upheld a New York statute
requiring hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by commercial insurers and certain other health maintenance organizations (HMOs), but not from patients covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield. Id. at 1674. Several commercial insurers
filed suit claiming that the New York statute "relates to" ERISA and thus pre-empts
imposing surcharges on patients whose commercial insurance coverage was purchased by an ERISA plan. Id. at 1672. The District Court for the Southern District
of New York granted the plaintiffs summary judgment. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo,
813 F. Supp. 996, 999 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom.,
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645 (1995). Before being reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court. Travelers Ins. Co., 14
F.3d at 725 (relying on Shaw, 463 U.S. 85, and District of Columbia v. Greater
Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992)). The Second Circuit held that ERISA's
preemption clause must be read broadly to preempt any state law having a connection with, or reference to, covered benefit plans. Id. at 719.
4' Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at 656. The Second Circuit concluded that "the
three
surcharges 'relate to' ERISA because they impose a significant economic burden on
commercial insurers and HMOs" and thus "have an impermissible impact on ERISA
plan structure and administration." Travelers Ins. Co., 14 F.3d at 721. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding New York's surcharge statute did not
"relate to" employee benefits within the meaning of ERISA's preemption provision.
Blue Cross, 514 U.S.at 649. "We simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the
frustrating difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives of
the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive." Id. at 656; see also Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989)
(finding the language of ERISA section 514 unhelpful).
46Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at 655 (citations omitted).
47Id. at 656.
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BCL section 630 was related to ERISA, but also that the Union's
cause of action fell within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement
provision." The Second Circuit erred on each of these holdings.
A.

Does BCL section 630 "relateto" an ERISA plan?

The Second Circuit in Romney approached the question of
whether BCL section 630 was preempted by ERISA by analyzing
whether the statute "relate[d] to" ERISA.49 The Romney court
defined the phrase "relates to" as "having a connection with or
reference to.""0 The Second Circuit further opined that a state
law is "relate[d] to" ERISA plans if the state law either made an
explicit reference to ERISA plans or disserved the basic purpose
of ERISA's preemption provision.51 The court concluded that
BCL section 630 was preempted on both grounds, although either ground standing alone, according to the court, would have
been sufficient to support a finding of ERISA preemption.52
1.

Explicit Reference

In Mackey v. Lanier CollectionAgency and Service,53 the Supreme Court of the United States provided guidance on what is
required to find that a state law explicitly refers to ERISA. At
issue in Mackey were two Georgia statutes, an anti-garnishment
statute and a garnishment statute of general application. The
anti-garnishment statute provided in pertinent part: "[flunds or
benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee benefit plan or
program subject to the provisions of the federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, shall not be
subject to the process of garnishment ....
The Court held that
this particular anti-garnishment statute was preempted by
48 See Romney, 94 F.3d at 80 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
481
U.S. 58, 63 (1987), and Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561,
573 (2d Cir. 1995)).
4 Id. at
78.
Id. (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97).
5 Id-at 78 (defining basic purpose of preemption as means to "avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.") (citing Greenblatt,68 F.3d at 574).
62 Romney, 94 F.3d
at 78.
3 486 U.S. 825 (1982).
See id. at 828 n.2 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 18-4-22.1 (1982)) (emphasis
added). This statute had the effect of protecting ERISA welfare benefit plans from
garnishment according to Georgia law, but did not afford the same protection to
non-ERISA plans. Id. at 830 n.4.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:691

ERISA section 514(a) because it explicitly referenced and solely
applied to ERISA employee benefit plans.55
In contrast, the court concluded that ERISA did not preempt
Georgia's general garnishment statute. 6 The Court distinguished the general application garnishment statute from the
anti-garnishment statute on the basis that the former did not
contain language that "specifically mention[ed]" or "single[d] out"
ERISA plans for special treatment. 5'
Analyzing BCL section 630 within the framework provided
by the Supreme Court in Mackey, it is apparent that the Second
Circuit erred in holding that BCL section 630 made explicit reference to ERISA by defining "wages or salaries" as "all compensation and benefits payable by an employer ... includ[ing] ...
employer contributions to or payments of insurance or welfare
benefits [and] employer contributions to pension or annuity
funds .,58
BCL section 630 does not make explicit reference to
ERISA by specifically mentioning or singling out ERISA plans.5 9
The basic thrust of BCL section 630 is to define shareholder liability for certain types of corporate debt enumerated in the
statute.60 BCL section 630's relationship to ERISA is "too tenuous, remote or peripheral ... to warrant a finding" that BCL section 630 "relates to" or explicitly references an ERISA plan. 5'

"Id. at 830 ( "Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1, which singles out ERISA employee
welfare benefit plans for different treatment under state garnishment procedures is
pre-empted under § 514(a). The state statute's express reference to ERISA plans
suffices to bring it within the federal law's pre-emptive reach.").
Id. at 831-32.
57 Id. at 831. The Court recognized that ERISA's preemptive effect is not limited
to state laws explicitly referencing ERISA and went on to analyze whether the
Georgia general garnishment statute "relates to" ERISA welfare benefit plans. Id.
The Court held that ERISA does not "forbid garnishment of an ERISA welfare
benefit plan, even where the purpose is to collect judgments against plan participants." Id. at 841.
58 See Romney v. Lin, 94 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting N.Y. BUS. CORP.

LAW § 630(b)).
" See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text for discussion of BCL section
630.
, See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text for discussion of BCL section

630.

61 See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,
100 n.21 (1983) (setting forth
the "too tenuous, remote or peripheral" standard); see also District of Columbia v.
Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 n.1 (1992) (quoting Shaw).

19971

ERISA PREEMPTION

2. Disservice to the Purpose of Preemption (Avoiding a
Multiplicity of Regulation)
The Romney court further justified its conclusion by maintaining that BCL section 630 disserved the basic purpose of preemption.62 Congress's primary intention when enacting ERISA
was to protect against the mismanagement of plan funds' and to
provide for the uniform administration of ERISA plans.6 With
the inclusion of ERISA's preemption provision, Congress intended to relieve employers from having to comply with differing
and inconsistent state regulatory requirements.6 5 In enacting
ERISA with its broad preemption provision, Congress thus intended to provide an incentive to employers to maintain ERISA
plans by alleviating the burdens caused by subjecting employers
to a multiplicity of state regulations. Congress did not intend for
ERISA to preempt any and all state statutes providing incentives to, or deterring corporate employers from, establishing and
maintaining ERISA plans.66
The Romney court incorrectly viewed BCL section 630 as an
"alternative enforcement mechanism" that would interfere with
The
the uniform administration of employee benefit plans.
court reasoned that ERISA does not provide for shareholder liability and "[b]y changing remedies § 630 would alter the incen61See Romney, 94 F.3d at 80 (stating that basic purpose of preemption is
"namely 'to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans'") (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657
(1995)).
6 California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 117 S.
Ct. 832, 838 (1997) (citing Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989)).
Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at 657 (citing Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S.
113, 142 (1990)).
. Id. The Blue Cross Court noted that the preemption provision was enacted "to
ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits
law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying
requiring the tailoring of plans and emwith conflicting directives among states ...
ployer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction." Id. at 656-57
(quoting Ingersoll Rand, 498 U.S. at 142). Representative Dent stated the purpose
was to "eliminate the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation." Id. at 657 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29197 (1974)).
" See, e.g., Dillingham Constr., 117 S.Ct. 832 (upholding California's prevailing
wage law which provided economic incentive to comply with the State's requirements); Blue Cross, 514 U.S. 645 (upholding a New York surcharge statute despite
the fact that it tended to make Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans look more attractive
than other commercial insurance).
67 See Romney, 94 F.3d at 80 (quoting Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at 657).
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tives for employers to create and maintain ERISA plans, and
thereby would affect ERISA plans in ways Congress did not intend."" Any effect that BCL section 630 might have on the creation of ERISA plans is too indirect to support a finding of preemption. BCL section 630 neither affects the primary liability of
corporate employers for delinquent ERISA plan contributions,
nor does it mandate or affect any terms of the plan itself.
Unable to base its finding of preemption upon the aforementioned substantive grounds, the Second Circuit attempted to
justify its conclusion with the proposition that BCL section 630
"would alter the incentives for employers to create and maintain
ERISA plans," and thereby affect ERISA plans.69 This argument
is flawed in several respects. The Second Circuit's argument
fails to recognize and respect the separate identities of a corporation and its shareholders by assuming that a corporation will
make decisions with respect to establishing ERISA funds based
on the potential for shareholder liability. Given that a corporation and its shareholders are separate and distinct legal entities,
it is unlikely that a corporation would refuse to establish an
ERISA plan based solely upon the fear of potential future shareholder liability. Even if this were the case, the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers Insurance Company" indicates that such an effect would nevertheless
be too indirect to warrant preemption.
In Blue Cross, the Court concluded that ERISA did not preempt a New York statute imposing surcharges on commercial insurance coverage and not on Blue Cross & Blue Shield plans
funded by ERISA plans.7 ' "Because ERISA plans ...were predominant among the purchasers of insurance, the statute was
asserted to run afoul of ERISA's preemption provision."72 The
Supreme Court upheld the New York statute despite the fact
that the additional surcharges imposed on commercial insurance
would make Blue Cross & Blue Shield plans more attractive to
68

Id. at 81 (stating that permitting suits against shareholders under section 630

reallocates burden of establishing and maintaining ERISA plans).
69

Id.

70 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
7'Blue Cross, 514 U.S.
72

645.
California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 117 S.

Ct. 832, 839 (1997) (citing Brief for Petitioner at 1-2, New York State Conference of
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (No. 931408)).
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consumers and would have an effect on the choices made by insurance buyers. 73 Even though "[tihe resulting cost variations
encouraged insurance purchasers, including ERISA plans, to74
provide insurance benefits through [Blue Cross & Blue Shield],"
the Court upheld the statute reasoning that it "did not bind plan
administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a
regulation of an ERISA plan itself,"75 nor did "the indirect influence of the surcharges preclude uniform administrative practice
or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package." 6
Analyzing BCL section 630 according to the reasoning set
forth in Blue Cross, it logically follows that any effect BCL section 630 might have on the creation of ERISA plans would be
indirect as well. A state statute providing for shareholder liability, like a statute imposing additional surcharges, has only an
indirect effect on ERISA plans and therefore does not "relate to"
ERISA in a way that requires preemption. Further, BCL section
630 does "not bind plan administrators to any particular choice
and thus function as a regulation of an ERISA plan," nor does
"the indirect influence of [BCL section 6301 preclude uniform
administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate
benefit practice."7 BCL section 630 imposes no regulatory requirements with regard to the administration of employee benefit plans and in no way impinges on Congress's goal of uniform
administration of employee benefit plans.78
B. Does BCL Section 630 Fall "Within the Scope of" ERISA's
Civil Enforcement Provision?
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that state laws providing alternative enforcement mechanisms to ERISA's civil enforcement provision "relate to" ERISA plans and, thus, trigger

7Blue
Cross, 514 U.S. at 659. "Although there is no evidence that the surcharges will drive every health insurance consumer to the Blues [Blue Cross/Blue
Shield], they do make the Blues more attractive (or less unattractive) as insurance
alternatives and thus have an indirect economic effect on choices made by insurance
buyers, including ERISA plans." Id74DillinghamConstr., 117 S. Ct. at 840.
""Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at 659.
76Id.
"See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text for discussion of BCL section
630.
78See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text for discussion of BCL section
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preemption.79 The Second Circuit in Romney held that BCL section 630 fell within ERISA's enforcement provision, ERISA section 502(a),0 which allows a plan fiduciary, participant, or beneficiary to enforce the obligation of an employer to contribute to
employee benefit plans pursuant to ERISA section 515.8 According to the Romney court, a cause of action already existed for the
Union to recover the delinquent contributions to ERISA funds
under ERISA section 502, predicated upon a violation of ERISA
section 515.82 BCL section 630 was thus determined to be an
"alternative enforcement mechanism." The claims that a plan
fiduciary or participant can bring under BCL section 630 and
ERISA sections 502 and 515 are, however, distinctly different.
ERISA section
515 establishes a cause of action only against an
"employer."83 Curiously, the Romney court failed to distinguish a
corporation from its shareholders and characterized both as
"employers."84 According to past decisions rendered by the Sec79Blue Cross, 514 U.S. at 658. "[Wle have held that state laws providing alter-

nate enforcement mechanisms also relate to ERISA plans, triggering pre-emption."
Id. (citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990)). In Ingersoll,
ERISA preempted employee's state law wrongful discharge suit. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,
498 U.S. 133. The employee alleged his discharge resulted from his employers desire
to avoid making contributions to the employee pension fund. Id. The Court reasoned
that ERISA section 510 already protected plan participants from termination based
on improper employer motivations. Id. at 143.
See Romney v. Lin, 94 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 1996). ERISA section 502(a) sets
forth a "comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing
of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans." Id. at 80 (quoting
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)). The Second Circuit in Romney
applied reasoning similar to an earlier decision when stating "[tihe effect of ERISA
preemption is wholly to eliminate state law claims by benefit plan participants and
beneficiaries, leaving them only the causes of action specifically provided in the
statute's civil enforcement provisions." Id. at 81 (quoting Smith v. Dunham-Bush,
Inc., 959 F.2d 6, 11 (2d Cir. 1992)) (emphasis omitted).
8' See id. at 80. ERISA section 515 provides in relevant part: "Every employer
who is obligated to make contributions to a multi-employer plan under the terms of
the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall make such
contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such
agreement." ERISA § 515, 29 U.S.C. § 1145.
82 Romney, 94 F.3d at 81 ("ERISA § 502(a) already provides a cause
of action to
enforce employer contributions to ERISA plans: a plan fiduciary may obtain relief
for delinquencies pursuant to ERISA § 515).
" ERISA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (ERISA section 3 defines an employer as anyone "acting indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee
benefit plan").
See Romney, 94 F.3d at 80-81 (discussing BCL section 630's relationship to
ERISA section 515 and ERISA section 502(a)).
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ond Circuit, an "employer" within the meaning of ERISA section
515 is one who is "obligated" to make contributions. 5 Although
individual shareholders of a corporation may voluntarily choose
to obligate themselves personally for contributions to ERISA
plans, and thereby become "employers" within the meaning of
ERISA section 515, without assuming personal liability a shareholder cannot constitute an "employer." 6 Without the underlying violation of ERISA section 515, no valid ERISA cause of action was involved in Romney v. Lin.
The Second Circuit's reasoning offends the concept that a
corporation and its shareholders are separate legal entities.
Shareholders have no general personal obligation to contribute
to pension or welfare benefit funds. Under BCL section 630 the
obligation to satisfy an outstanding judgment against the corporation for employee related services is triggered only upon the
default of the corporation.'
The Second Circuit failed to recognize the difference between an "employer" obligated to contribute
to ERISA funds and a "shareholder" with no such obligation."
Because the "ten largest shareholders" of a corporation do not
constitute an "employer" within the meaning of ERISA section
515, the action brought by the Union in Romney was improperly
removed to federal court. 9 Without a finding that the "ten largest shareholders" constitute an "employer," the second prong of
the doctrine of complete preemption is not satisfied.9 ° That is,
the action does not fall within ERISA's civil enforcement provi"See Cement and Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Lollo, 35
F.3d 29, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that employer under ERISA is one who is contractually obligated to make pension contributions); see also Greenblatt v. Delta
Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561, 575 (2d Cir. 1995) (defining "employer"
within meaning of ERISA § 3 to be anyone "acting indirectly in the interest of an
employerD in relation to an employee benefit plan") (quoting 29 U.S.C. §1002(5));
Rockney v. Blohorn, 877 F.2d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 1989) (asserting that corporate officers could be held liable under ERISA if terms of plan imposed liability); Massachusetts Laborers' Health & Welfare Fund v. Starrett Paving Corp., 845 F.2d 23, 25 (1st
Cir. 1988) (permitting recovery under section 515 against employers obligated to
make contributions).
- See Cement and Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund, 35 F.3d 29.
7See
supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text for discussion of BCL section
630.
6See Romney, 94 F.3d at 80-81.
9See supra note 28 and accompanying text for discussion of doctrine of complete preemption.
"0See supra note 28 and accompanying text for discussion of doctrine of complete preemption.
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sion. 9

This assertion is clearly illustrated by the Supreme Court's
decision in Peacock v. Thomas.92 In Peacock, the Court held that

a "veil-piercing claim does not state a cause of action under
ERISA and cannot independently support federal jurisdiction." 3
In Peacock, the plaintiff-employee recovered a judgment against
a corporate employer for unpaid contributions to ERISA funds.'
The judgment was returned un-executed and the plaintiffemployee later filed a veil-piercing claim seeking to enforce the
judgment against the corporation's largest shareholder.95 The
Court stated that veil-piercing is not an independent ERISA
cause of action, "but rather is a means of imposing liability on an
underlying cause of action."96 "Because ... no 'underlying' viola-

tion of any provision of ERISA or an ERISA plan [was alleged],"
jurisdiction was not properly conferred upon the district court.97
The Court further stated that "[olther than the existence of the
ERISA judgment itself, this suit has little connection to the
ERISA case."98 Although the Court disposed of the appeal on ju91See supra note 28 and accompanying text for discussion of doctrine of complete preemption.
92 116 S. Ct. 862 (1996) (reversing Fourth Circuit decision for lack of jurisdiction).
93 Id. at 866.
94 Id.
at 865. In 1987, Thomas, a former employee of Tru-Tech, Inc., filed an
ERISA suit against Tru-Tech and Peacock, an officer and shareholder of Tru-Tech,
for delinquent pension benefits. Id. Finding that Peacock was not a fiduciary, the
district court entered a judgment against Tru-Tech only. Id.
9"Id. "Thomas unsuccessfully attempted to collect the judgment from Tru-Tech.
Thomas then sued Peacock in federal court claiming that Peacock had entered into a
civil conspiracy to siphon assets from Tru-Tech to prevent satisfaction of the ERISA
judgment." Id. The complaint was later amended to assert a claim for "Piercing the
Corporate Veil Under ERISA and Applicable Federal Law." Id. The district court
agreed to pierce the corporate veil and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 866.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Id.
"Id. at 866-67 (quoting 1 C. KEATING & G. O'GRADNEY, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41, p. 603 (perm. ed. 1990)).
97 See id. at 867. The Court rejected the argument that this "suit arose under

ERISA § 502(a)(3), which authorizes civil actions for 'appropriate equitable relief to
redress violations of ERISA or the terms of an ERISA plan." Id. at 866 (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)). Section 502(a)(3) "does not, after all, authorize 'appropriate
equitable relief at large, but only 'appropriate equitable relief for the purpose of
'redress ing any] violations or ... enforc[ing] any provisions' of ERISA or an ERISA
plan." Id. (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993)) (emphasis
omitted).
98See id. at 869 (describing how action to enforce judgment was based on theory
of relief that did not exist at time court entered judgment in ERISA case).
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risdictional grounds, the possibility that the plaintiff-employee
might ultimately be successful in enforcing the judgment against
the shareholder was not ruled out.99
The similarities between an action implemented under BCL
section 630 and an action premised on veil-piercing are similar.
Both actions seek to hold shareholders liable for an existing
ERISA judgment and therefore have only a remote connection to
ERISA. In both Peacock and Romney, each of the plaintiffemployees had previously obtained a judgment for delinquent
contributions to employee benefit plans. The employees were
merely seeking to enforce the judgment against shareholders of
the corporate employer. Although the employee in Peacock was
suing under a veil-piercing theory and the employee in Romney
was suing under BCL section 630, neither suit alleged an underlying ERISA violation.
In Romney, it was only after unsuccessful attempts to collect
the judgment against the corporation that the Union brought
suit under BCL section 630(a) to enforce the judgment against
the principal shareholder. The Union did not seek to hold the
principal shareholder liable under ERISA. Other than the existence of an ERISA judgment, the BCL section 630(a) claim had
only a remote connection to ERISA and should not alone provide
the basis for federal jurisdiction.
Moreover, BCL section 630 is a state law mechanism that
defines and imposes liability upon shareholders for pre-existing
In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency and
corporate debt.'
Service,' the Supreme Court concluded that "Congress did not
intend to forbid the use of state-law mechanisms of executing
The
judgments against ERISA welfare benefit plans .
'9 Id. at 866 ("Even if ERISA permits a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil to
reach a defendant not otherwise subject to suit under ERISA, Thomas could invoke
the jurisdiction of the federal courts only by independently alleging a violation of an
ERISA provision or term of the plan.").
'o See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text for discussion of BCL section
630. 30
486 U.S. 825 (1988).
102 See id. at 831. The Court distinguished between two types of actions: 1) those

brought pursuant to ERISA section 502 to secure benefits or enforce rights against
ERISA plans, and 2) actions against ERISA plans for state-law claims. Id. at 832-33.
"ERISA does not provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments in either of these two types of actions." Id. at 833. "[Sltate-law methods for collecting
money judgments must, as a general matter, remain undisturbed by ERISA; otherwise, there would be no way to enforce such a judgment won against an ERISA
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Mackey Court further held that ERISA preemption did not preclude the application of a state statute despite the fact that it
imposed administrative costs and burdens upon ERISA plans. 3
BCL section 630 is not an "alternative enforcement mecha°
nism."'O
Rather, it is a state-law mechanism for enforcing a
judgment and is triggered only by a corporation's default.0 5 Furthermore, even if any administrative costs and burdens would be
imposed upon ERISA plans as a result of the enforcement of BCL
section 630, their effects would be indirect.0 6
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ERISA PREEMPTION
In February 1997, the Supreme Court rendered its most recent ERISA preemption decision, California Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction. 7 In Dillingham Construction, California's prevailing wage law, which
allows for the payment of lower apprenticeship wages to employplan." Id. at 834.
'03 See id. at 831. Petitioners described the prospective administrative burdens
and costs by stating that plan trustees would be "served with a garnishment summons, become parties to a suit, and must respond and deposit the demanded funds
due the beneficiary-debtor-funds that otherwise they are required to hold and pay
out to those beneficiaries." Id.
'04 See Matarazzo v. Segall, 580 N.Y.S.2d 644, 646 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Kings County
1992) (opining that "[a] section 630 action is therefore regarded not as a renewed
determination on the merits but rather as an enforcement mechanism to protect the
employees of closely held corporations."), rev'd on other grounds, 600 N.Y.S.2d 890,
892 (Sup Ct. App. Term 1993) (reversing summary judgment because, "[wihile there
is an 'enforcement mechanism' in place to permit the suit against the shareholder,
there should still be a requirement that permits the shareholder to have his or her
day in court"); see also supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text for discussion of
BCL section 630.
105 See Lindsey v. Winkler, 277 N.Y.S.2d 768, 770 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County
1967) ("Section 630 of the Business Corporation Law was enacted as a safeguard to
laborers, servants or employees of corporations which, upon insolvency of the corporation, would leave such working people without recourse and payment for their
work, labor and services.").
See, e.g., Blue Cross, 514 U.S. 645, 660 (1995) (providing example of indirect
effect on plan administration). In Blue Cross, the Supreme Court found that a statute requiring hospitals to collect surcharges did "not bind plan administrators to
any particular choice and thus function as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself" and
any "indirect influence of the surcharges [did not] preclude uniform administrative
practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package." Id. at 660. Accordingly, it is asserted that section 630 does not bind plan administrators to any particular choice and thus function as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself nor does its
indirect influence preclude uniform administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package. Id.; accord California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997).
107

117 S. Ct. 832 (1997).
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ees participating in approved state programs, was not preempted."' 8 Even though the result of the application of California's statute is that a higher prevailing wage must be paid to
employees not participating in state-approved apprenticeship
programs, the Court found the California wage law to be indistinguishable from the surcharge statute at issue in Blue Cross."9
Neither law "bind[s] ERISA plans to anything.""' The effect of
the California wage law, according to the Court, is "merely to
provide some measure of economic incentive to comport with the
State's requirements, at least to the extent that those programs
seek to provide apprentices who can work on public works projects at a lower wage."' "The prevailing wage statute alters the
incentives,
but does not dictate the choices, facing ERISA
2
plans.""
The Court, proceeding on the assumption that historic state
police powers were not to be preempted by ERISA and finding no
indication in ERISA or its legislative history that Congress intended to preempt such statutes, upheld the California statute."
"We could not hold pre-empted a state law in an area of traditional state regulation based on so tenuous a relation without
doing grave violence to our presumption that Congress intended
nothing of the sort.""' Not only does this opinion affirm Blue
Cross and indicate that Romney was wrongly decided, the decision clearly sets forth a standard to be followed in future ERISA
10'

Id. at 835. "The State of California requires a contractor on a public works

project to pay its workers the prevailing wage in the project's locale. An exception to
this requirement permits a contractor to pay a lower wage to workers participating
in an approved apprenticeship program." Id. In Dillingham Construction, the petitioner charged Dillingham, the contractor, and Sound Systems Media, the subcontractor, with violating Cal. Lab. Code Ann. Section 1771 by paying the lower apprenticeship wage, rather than the higher prevailing wage to apprentices not
participating in state approved programs. Id. at 836.
...
Id. at 840.
11oId. at 841.
111Id.
112 Id.
at 842. "It cannot be gainsaid that [the California wage statute] has the
effect of encouraging apprenticeship programs-including ERISA plans--to meet
the standards set out by California, but it has not been demonstrated here that the
added inducement created by the wage break available on state public works projects is tantamount to a compulsion upon apprenticeship programs.' " Id.
1'3
Id. at 841. "Given the paucity of indication in ERISA and its legislative history of any intent on the part of Congress to pre-empt state apprenticeship training
standards ...
we are reluctant to alter our ordinary 'assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act." Id.
114 Id.
at 842.
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preemption cases. Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, in a concurring
opinion, advocated disposing of the "relates to" analysis in its
entirety stating that "applying the 'relate to' provision according
to its terms was a project doomed to failure .... ,115

"We discern

no solid basis for believing that Congress, when it designed
ERISA, intended to fundamentally alter traditional pre-emption
analysis."1 '
Shortly after the Dillingham Construction decision was rendered, the Second Circuit once again faced an ERISA preemption
issue. In Burgio and Campofelice, Inc. v. NYS Department of
Labor,"7' the Second Circuit held that section 220 of the New
York Labor Law was not preempted by ERISA."' Although the
Burgio court purported to apply Blue Cross and Dillingham Construction, it declined to confront the erroneous decision rendered
in Romney. The Burgio court attempted to distinguish Romney
by stating that "Burgio's obligation does not arise under ERISA
or a collective bargaining agreement providing for ERISA benefits, but directly under Labor Law § 223.""' In Burgio, the Second Circuit appeared to misunderstand BCL section 630 and its
implications or it simply refused to recognize its mistake in
Romney. A shareholder's liability under BCL section 630 does
not arise under ERISA or a collective bargaining agreement
providing for ERISA benefits, but directly under New York Business Corporations Law section 630.
The Burgio court further undermined the validity of the
Romney decision when it stated that "[an ERISA preemption
action is not the appropriate vehicle by which to decide such
matters, particularly since Burgio cannot, as a non-signatory to
"1

Id. at 843.

116 Id.

(quoting John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank,

510 U.S. 86, 99 (1993)). The concurring opinion indicated that current ERISA jurisprudence should apply the law of ordinary field and conflict preemption. Id.
117

107 F.3d 1000 (2d Cir. 1997). In Burgio, "a general contractorD brought this

action (1) to enjoin the state from enforcing New York Labor Laws §§ 220, 223
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1997) (the prevailing wage law), against Burgio for wage
supplements that Burgio's subcontractor allegedly failed to pay its employees; and
(2) to declare the prevailing wage law preempted by federal law." Id. at 1003.
18 Id. "Section 220 ... requires that all bidders on public works contracts assume
the cost of prevailing wage supplements .... Id. New York Labor Law defines wage
supplements to include "health, welfare, non-occupational disability, retirement, vacation benefits, holiday pay, life insurance, and apprenticeship training." Id. Despite
this definition of "wage supplements," the Second Circuit did not find that section
220 explicitly referenced ERISA.
119 Id. at 1010.

1997]

ERISA PREEMPTION

the collective bargaining agreements with the unions, be held liable to the benefit plans as an 'employer' under ERISA."'2 0 This
is exactly the point the Second Circuit failed to recognize in
Romney. The shareholder at issue in Romney was not a signatory to the collective bargaining agreement and likewise could
not be characterized as an "employer" under ERISA.
Although the Second Circuit reached the correct decision in
Burgio, the portion of the opinion distinguishing Burgio from
Romney is questionable at best. Reconciling the Burgio and
Romney decisions is difficult. In light of such divergent reasoning, it is difficult to determine whether the Second Circuit is correctly applying the law of ERISA preemption. The Supreme
Court appears to have clarified its stance on ERISA preemption.
Hopefully, the Second Circuit will follow suit.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit, in Romney v. Lin, erred in holding that
section 630 of New York's Business Corporation Law is preempted by ERISA. BCL section 630 does not relate to ERISA by
either explicitly referring to ERISA or by disserving the purpose
of preemption. Further, BCL section 630 does not fit squarely
within ERISA's civil enforcement scheme. The requirements of
complete preemption not being present, the Second Circuit improperly held that BCL section 630 was preempted by ERISA.
HeatherM. Susac
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